The Story Behind A £1.5 Million Grant In Gwynedd.

Previous blog posts ‘Service User Involvement in North Wales’ and ‘We Control All The Outcomes’ describe how there is no effective or genuine representation for ‘services users’ and carers in north Wales and indeed never has been. If anyone at any time had ever ‘listened to’ a service user or carer the ‘services’ would simply not be in this state. For years, ‘service user involvement’ was left to completely ineffective bodies like the ‘Independent Advocacy Service’ or the ‘Gwynedd and Ynys Mon Users Forum’ (which were staffed and managed by people who were terrified of the staff and managers of the lethal services whom they were supposed to be holding to account), or Unllais (whom I knew were refusing to make representation regarding the mental health services even when they were being told of the most serious abuses). Until March 2016 Unllais held the contract for service user involvement in north Wales. Considering how hopeless Unllais had been at representing and involving service users, the ending of their contract would have been the most wonderful opportunity for the Betsi to begin some real ‘service user and carer involvement’. Readers will know that this never happened and instead a new nightmare is promised, as the ‘contract’ was subsequently given to CAIS/Hafal, who have now formed another vehicle, CANIAD (please see blog post ‘Introducing Caniad!’). So Dr Dafydd Alun Jones and Lucille Hughes, who sit on the Board of Trustees of CAIS, are now responsible for ‘service user involvement’ in north Wales. We can assume that the outcome from this will therefore be truly grim. Many of my previous blog posts describe the unethical and criminal behaviour of Dafydd Alun Jones – and Lucille Hughes was named in the Waterhouse Report as knowing that a paedophile ring was operating in Gwynedd Social Services whilst she was the Director of these ‘Services’ but that she was failing to act. Dafydd and Lucille are now in their eighties, they have never protected the interests of service users and carers before and I very much doubt that they are going to start now.

As soon as I heard that CAIS/Hafal had landed this ‘contract’ from the Betsi, I was interested to find out exactly how this had happened, particularly as there seems to massive conflicts of interest in many other ‘contracts for services’ being handed out by the Betsi. Blog post ‘A Total Lack of Transparency’ details how the whole process has been shrouded in secrecy.

So I recently put in a FoI request to Wrexham County Borough Council (who were inexplicably allowed by the Betsi to ‘lead’ on this whole travesty) in an attempt to find out exactly how CAIS had landed this contract and the identities of the people involved. Last week I received a reply from Wrexham Council which didn’t answer all my questions but did provide a lot of enlightening information. Wrexham Council told me that I wasn’t allowed to reproduce ‘copyrighted’ information without permission and although I’ve written to them requesting this permission I haven’t received a reply. So I cannot reproduce the wonderful information that I have been provided with in it’s entirety, but I can blog about the salient points within this information.

The first surprise that I got was how much this ‘contract’ was worth. It was worth 1.5 million. That’s right, the Betsi have channelled 1.5 million quid to Dafydd et al for five years worth of ‘service user involvement’. The Betsi are currently nearly bankrupting the Welsh Govt so bad is their financial position. But CAIS have been given 1.5 million. The information given to me also confirmed that a grand total of FOUR unidentified service users were ‘involved’ in this process. And I bet they won’t see much of the 1.5 million that has been handed over – indeed, I was sent a rather simplistic ‘presentation’ allegedly designed by one of the ‘service users’ regarding what ‘involvement’ means to him and he mentioned that he was able to claim his expenses. So he gets his bus fare and the price of a lunchtime sandwich reimbursed and Dafydd et al net 1.5 million.

The information provided told me that there were only two ‘bids’ put in for the ‘tender’, one from Unllais and one from CAIS/Hafal. The fact that ‘service user involvement’ was subject to a ‘tendering’ process alone excludes nearly all service users and carers. How many patients and carers are ever going to ‘bid for a contract’? How many even knew that all this was happening? I didn’t and I actually try to keep aware of what is going on in the mental health services in north Wales. But people on the ‘professional’ networks will have known all about it, because the information sent to me revealed that ‘from January 2014 onwards, the Health Board’s Commissioning Manager…attended all the Local Planning Groups in North Wales’. Well you won’t find many service users and carers in them, but ‘professionals’ know all about these planning groups, who sits on them and when they hold their meetings. It was also mentioned that the Commissioning Manager attended ‘Third Sector’ networks (CAIS is a Third Sector organisation) and Service User and Carer networks. Now in a region that was not blighted by corruption and criminal activity in the mental health services, the Commissioning Manager attending Service User and Carer Networks would be a positive sign. But in north Wales, most ‘service users’ experiences of the ‘services’ are so bad that when they finally wave goodbye to the services (if indeed they ever manage to obtain a service in the first place) they want no more to do with them. They do not join a ‘service user network’. Furthermore, in my experience the ‘service user networks’ in north Wales have always been manipulated or indeed completely controlled by the ‘services’ themselves or the lame third sector organisations such as MIND who have for years colluded with the abuses of the mental health services. And some of the service user groups are run by CAIS. So it’s highly unlikely that any grassroots service user and carer groups would have encountered the Commissioning Manager who was allegedly publicising the commissioning process.

But what if north Wales happened to have a really enterprising group of service users and carers who did know that a commissioning process was happening and who were even prepared to form a group to bid for this contract? Well the information provided to me suggests that they would have found such bidding very difficult indeed. For a start, the information regarding the bidding process and what needs to be done to land the bid successfully is littered with acronyms with are never explained. I have a PhD and a research background in social policy and sociology in the Welsh context and I didn’t know what most of those acronyms meant. But it gets worse. Even if a group of service users had managed to plough through all this and somehow decipher it, at the ‘Meet The Buyer Event’, in the ‘procurement information’, provided by Rachel Glynn-Thomas (‘category manager’) there was a reference to a preference for the bidders to make use of technology – specifically to submit the bid via e procurement, ‘utilising the Bravo Solutions etenderWales software hosted by the Welsh Government’. Well that will be familiar to every service user and carer in Wales won’t it, they’ll use it daily. Service users wanting to bid will have needed a good accountant as well, because they had to complete one of the most taxing spreadsheets that I’ve ever seen, worse even than the spreadsheets that I used to complete when I wrote research bids for the research councils that fund academic research (and I had the University accountant to help me). Now, even if our hypothetical service user group did contain a social policy expert, an accountant, someone who was familiar with procurement procedures used by the Welsh Govt as well as someone who knew how to install and use the specialised software used by the Welsh Govt for procurement, there was something interesting about when the ‘Meet The Buyer Event’ was held. I don’t remember seeing it being advertised anywhere. But if I was someone who might have been looking out for an opportunity to bid for a Welsh Government contract and was familiar with the procedure of bidding for these contracts, I’d have been looking at the website Sell2Wales. The contract was advertised on Sell2Wales – but not until nearly a month after the ‘Meet The Buyer Event’ had been held. So anyone attending that ‘Meet The Buyer Event’ (the only opportunity to receive information and ask questions) could have only known about it from an inside contact.

The ‘Meet The Buyer’ event was held in the Boardroom of Optic St Asaph, a location virtually impossible to get to by public transport – so interested service users who did know about it will have needed their own cars to get there. The people making up the panel at the ‘Meet The Buyer’ event included Wyn Thomas (Assistant Director, Community Partnership Development, BCUHB), Vicky Jones (Regional Substance Misuse Commissioning and Development Manager), Jane Jones (Partnership Manager, BCUHB), Rachel Glynn-Thomas (Category Manager, Wrexham Borough County Council) and Sion ap Glynn (Business Support Wales). These are not the sort of people that your average service user would know – but I bet people from CAIS knew them, particularly as CAIS already provide ‘substance misuse services’ on behalf of the Betsi and thus work ‘in partnership’ with them.

There were also two ‘service users’ on this panel, a David Holmes and an Andrea Hughes – however at least one of the powerpoints supplied to me allegedly presented by the ‘service users’ contained a number of highly complex flow charts. I have yet to meet a service user who would ever include such things in a presentation on ‘What Involvement Means To Me’. These managerialist flow charts were also noticeably inconsistent with the rest of the presentation material from the ‘service users’, which pivoted around claiming expenses, supporting others, feeling like a valuable human being, undertaking an entry level education course and no longer being sectioned. I suspect that the managerialist flow charts had been added to those presentations by someone else.

The information supplied to me also suggested that someone might have been expecting a bid from CAIS/Hafal. The information is littered with references to ‘substance misuse services’. Indeed mentions of ‘substance misuse services’ were being prioritised – again and again they were mentioned in the remit after ‘service user involvement’. But there are other rather big clues as well. One slide sent to me in response to my FoI request was a presentation by Jane Jones, Partnership Manager, BCUHB. She certainly seems to gearing up for a partnership with CAIS/Hafal – her presentation states that ‘we would welcome bids from a consortia or partnership but partners must be clear about their partnership arrangements before submitting an application’. No doubt Jane Jones wanted to ensure that any such partnerships contained the word ‘CAIS’ in their ‘arrangements’. The biggest clue however is contained on the slide prepared by Rachel Glynn-Thomas regarding ‘procurement information’: ‘WCBC [Wrexham County Borough Council] on behalf of the Six North Wales Authorities represented by the Area Planning Board for Substance Misuse and with the Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board…’ So at the very heart of the ‘procurement process’ was the Area Planning Board For Substance Misuse – who are presumably the people who have already commissioned CAIS to provide ‘substance misuse services’ and know them well. Rachel’s slide mentions the need to ensure ‘best value’ and that a marketised commissioning process is the best way of achieving this – ah, so that’s how 1.5 million found its way into the pockets of Dafydd Alun Jones, Lucille Hughes et al…

The dirty deed has now been done, the dosh has gone to CAIS/Hafal and now Dafydd, Lucille and their mates are dictating what ‘service user involvement’ in north Wales looks like. One of the slides sent to me gives some ‘facts and figures’ regarding the region covered by the Betsi. It mentions that there are 1,600 staff employed in the Mental Health Division. So ‘service users’ who dare to complain are faced with 1,600 people sticking together like glue. (It’s tempting to suggest that there are probably more staff employed in the Mental Health Division than patients successfully obtaining a service.) And now they’ve got CAIS to represent their interests against the 1,600 people.

Whilst reading through the information supplied to me in response to my FoI request, any, many questions sprung to mind. But the biggest question of all surely has to be that if CAIS have been given 1.5 million for five years worth of ‘service user involvement’ how much are they raking in for providing all their other ‘services’? As Private Eye would say, I think we should be told…

http://www.drsallybaker.com/uncategorized/the-story-behind-1-5-million/

Complaint To The LGO Wales Re Gwynedd Council.

On Monday, the final bits of evidence relating to my complaint against Gwynedd Council were received by the Local Government Ombudsman.

I did not count the amount of pages sent but it was considerable, including the parents complaint from 2010 in which all points were upheld by the Independent Investigators.

Many people have advised that I am wasting my time but I am hopeful that the LGO will come to the same conclusion that I and many others, including Councillors, my MP and my AM have reached – that there is something very, very wrong with the way that criteria for services is being interpreted by certain officers and their staff.

This last year has been long and nightmarish. I anticipate major changes for the New Year and that services for the teenager in my care will finally be given.

Disabled children in Wales ‘three times more likely to suffer abuse than able-bodied’.

Disabled children are three times more likely to be abused than non-disabled children in Wales and are less likely to get the protection they need, a new report has revealed.

The NSPCC publication, which will be launched in Cardiff today, claims people’s reluctance to believe disabled children are suffering physical, sexual and emotional abuse is to blame.

The charity says there are “barriers” for the families of disabled children in accessing the right support services.

And it also blames a lack of professional skills, expertise and confidence in identifying child protection concerns and criticises the weakness of an effective child protection response across the UK.

The NSPCC fears cases go unreported because some disabled children have difficulties in communicating what is happening to them.

In addition, there are claims disabled children in residential care face particular risks of harm.

Mark Drakeford, Minister for Health and Social Services, will be at the Millennium Centre today to help unveil the report with the help of schoolchildren from Ysgol Pen-y-Bryn in Morriston, Swansea.

He said: “Enabling children to recognise and understand different forms of abuse is key to ensuring we respond effectively to concerns when they arise.

“The Social Services and Well-being Wales Act will strengthen the statutory framework which underpins how professionals who work with children and adults at risk ensure that they are protected from abuse.”

The report, called We Have a Right to be Safe, makes a number of recommendations to lower the levels of abuse.

It has called on the Welsh Government to introduce sex and relationships education for disabled children to raise their awareness of abuse and their ability to seek help.

The charity also wants to develop a “wider and deeper evidence base” to help the public better understand the vulnerability of disabled children to abuse and how they can be protected.

Viv Laing, NSPCC policy and public affairs manager for Wales, said: “Today’s report does demonstrate that there is knowledge and good practice out there but also that we need to share and build on that to ensure that our disabled children and young people are equally protected.

“We’re very much hoping to work alongside Welsh Government over the coming years to develop our knowledge of the issues facing disabled children and young people in Wales.

“This will help us better understand the issues they, and those who care for them, face so that they can be better protected.”

Ysgol Pen-Y Bryn is also to be the first special school in Wales to pilot an adapted version of the ChildLine Schools Service.

The ground-breaking service, which has to date visited 38,607 children across 684 schools in Wales, uses trained volunteers to help children understand abuse and recognise it if it occurs.

Aron Bradley, deputy headteacher at Ysgol Pen-y-Bryn, said: “As the report identifies, bullying is a particular area of increased risk for disabled children – because they’re more vulnerable.

“It’s very important for them to know what it is and where to get help and we’re pleased that the ChildLine Schools Service will help re-enforce that message.

“They will also provide valuable expert knowledge on sensitive issues which are not easily addressed in school.”

During today’s event, two new bilingual versions of the NSPCC’s successful Underwear Rule guide will also be launched to help parents teach children with learning disabilities and Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) about sexual abuse.

The guides were produced in association with Mencap and the National Autistic Society.

http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/health/disabled-children-wales-three-times-7960830

Down And (Nearly) Out In Gwynedd And London.

In 2008, I had a heart attack.
I had a stent inserted but during the operation I had a second heart attack and so another stent was needed.

My life until then had been spent working in the care field.
It began as a roving first aid responder at Heathrow Airport, then moved to caring for the elderly in a residential setting.
After a year working nights as a Care Assistant in a Nursing Home my nose took me into the field of mental health and dementia.
I found the work fascinating and heartbreaking due to the callous, profiteering nature of Care(!) Home providers.

I managed a sheltered housing scheme for 8 residents in East Sheen – which I hated.
Management  meant staying in an office, dealing with budgets, Doctors and social workers.

I moved on a lot back then.
Learning Difficulties, Challenging Behaviour and the most upsetting for me – Acquired Brain Injury.
Owners of Homes used me to clean sweep their businesses.
Each home was eager for my knowledge and ideas on dealing with ‘challenging’ clients and to train other carers.

Exploring other ideas I had meant working for Agencies where I lived in Clients homes.
24 hours a day, 7 days a week gave me even greater insights into the issues that my clients faced.
I chatted with neighbours of my clients, dispelling their fears and getting them onside.
I asked local businesses to help spend time with them and even give them some unpaid work.
All to get them out of the house and meet and engage with the community.
Exhausting and wonderful.

It transformed their lives and I hope transformed those who gave their time, cash and love to them.

The heart attacks meant an end to all that, sadly.

I discharged myself from hospital after three days.
For the first three months, I was crippled. Gasping for breath, my liver shut down and I turned an interesting shade of yellow.
My doctor was useless so I stopped going though I did continue to take 7 lots of medication for a year.

I was living in Islington at the time but it was isolating for me and expensive. Relying on savings meant I had to find alternative accommodation quickly.
An old friend kindly allowed me to stay in his flat in west London when he holidayed abroad. Another friend allowed me to sit in his workshop during the day to keep warm and even threw me some money and bought me food in return for answering the phone.

Soon I was offered other flat sitting opportunities and some people even paid me to protect their properties when they were away on business. A weekend here, a fortnight there – time passed and my health slowly improved.

One year after the heart attacks, my girlfriend was diagnosed with Breast cancer.
Never rains but pours eh ? Long weekends were spent at her place in Surrey

My girlfriend struggled through the chemotherapy and the rest of her treatment but, one year on, she was given the all clear. She had beaten cancer but our relationship had changed from lovers to carers for each other and we parted.

A year later and I began suffering other health problems. My breathing had never properly recovered and I developed many infections.My back and neck stiffened and caused me pain. My left hand began to hurt and I could no longer clench my fist. By this time, the Conservatives had been elected, London became meaner and many of my friends had left the city. I found myself struggling to find accommodation and work opportunities were drying up. Care work was no longer an option because of Insurance issues and my worsening health meant I was no longer reliable, even for the piecemeal work I sought.

Cutting my needs and relying more and more on my meagre savings I struggled on for another two years. During this time I met up with an ex partner who also was my oldest friend. She was living in Gwynedd, North Wales, with her autistic PDA son.

Social Services in the Gwynedd area are appalling. She has had no support and Bangor CAMHS refuse to acknowledge the boy has any mental health issues, at all. After one incident, in which the teenage boy used violence against her, I gritted my teeth and moved in with both of them. That was 18 months ago now.

All my years in Mental Health did not prepare me in anyway for PDA (Pathological Demand Avoidance). Within weeks my blood pressure went through the roof, chest pains, my heart rate became erratic. I ended up presenting myself at Shrewsbury A&E. (I have had experience of Ysbty Gwynedd and #BCUHB, who treated me after drinking contaminated water and, again when my partner miscarried our baby – it is my hope never to go there again). All the tests were good – well for a man with my cardiac issues and the Hospital put it down to stress.

I then signed on with the local Doctors Surgery and was given statins. Blood tests followed. The statin caused so much pain I could hardly move. A different statin and then Ramipril – more pain than before. I stopped the statin then realised it was the Ramipril. After nearly three months of pain and distress – I stopped the medication. My health improved – my stress levels did not.

The Doctor noticed something during an examination and ordered a Lung test. I failed and was diagnosed with COPD. I have not been back to see her since. My breathing has worsened this last year, blood pressure still too high but I need to be able to move quickly to deal effectively with the teenager and also my disabled partners needs are increasing as she ages.

The boy had recently been given four hours of support a week to aid with his social independence skills. Without warning or a re-assessment of his needs the hours were reduced to two – illegal in law. Take note anyone who has had their child’s support pulled.

The Support worker and Officer do not engage in any communication with us re the work they do with him. They refuse to give email addresses – no paper trail – do not give honest replies and are very evasive of communicating anything.  So unprofessional compared to the integrated planning around the client which I had been used to.

I believe my health issues are made worse by living in and dealing with the un-professionals in #Gwynedd. But without my support what will happen to the boy and my partner ?
In a few months my savings will be exhausted and what then ?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lost in Care – Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Abuse of Children in Care in the Former County Council Areas of Gwynedd and Clwyd since 1974.

Here you can browse the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Abuse of Children in Care in the Former County Council Areas of Gwynedd and Clwyd since 1974.

CONTENTS


Letter to the Rt Hon Paul Murphey MP, Secretary of State for Wales

Report Outline

Part I:

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: The appointment of the Tribunal and a brief account of its work

Chapter 2: The general background to the Inquiry

2.02  The independent investigation commissioned by Clwyd County Council: the Jillings Report

2.04  The Report of the Examination Team on Child Care Procedures and Practice in North Wales

2.07  Criminal proceedings prior to 1991

2.08  The complaints of Alison Taylor

2.12  The 1986/1987 police investigation

2.16  Alison Taylor’s further representations and her dismissal

2.23  The setting up of the 1991/1993 police investigation

2.25  The article in the Independent on Sunday

2.27  Other published allegations against Gordon Anglesea

2.29  Gordon Anglesea’s libel actions

2.33  The course of the 1991/1993 police investigation

2.35  Criminal proceedings following the 1991/1993 police investigation

2.36  Further events leading to the Jillings inquiry

Chapter 3: The legislative and administrative background in 1974

3.02  Report of the Seebohm Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services

3.05  Local Authority Social Services Act 1970

3.06  “Children in Trouble”

3.10  Children and Young Persons Act 1969

3.11  Community Homes Regulations 1972

3.16  The Children’s Regional Planning Committee for Wales

3.18  Local Government Act 1972

3.19  Appointment of senior officials to the Social Services Department of Clwyd County Council

3.22  Appointment of senior officials to the Social Services Department of Gwynedd County Council

Chapter 4: A summary of residential care provision for children in Clwyd between 1974 and 1996

4.01  The overall position in 1974

4.02  Local authority community homes in Clwyd in 1974

4.04  Controlled community homes in Clwyd in 1974

4.05  Assisted community homes in Clwyd in 1974

4.06  Other non-private residential establishments for children in Clwyd in 1974

4.09  Private children’s homes and schools in Clwyd in 1974

4.10  Bryn Alyn Community

4.12  Care Concern

4.17  Clwyd Hall for Child Welfare

4.18  Local authority community homes in Clwyd in 1985

4.21  Other community homes in Clwyd in 1985

4.22  Private children’s homes and schools in Clwyd in 1985

4.23  Expansion of the Bryn Alyn Community

4.28  Other private residential establishments for children in 1985

4.29  Decline of number of children in residential care by 1996

4.30  Local authority community homes in Clwyd in 1996

4.31  Private children’s homes and schools in Clwyd in 1996

4.32  The scope of our account of alleged abuse in Clwyd

Chapter 5: A summary of residential care provision for children in Gwynedd between 1974 and 1996

5.01  The overall position in 1974

5.02  Local authority community homes in Gwynedd in 1974

5.03  Voluntary homes in Gwynedd in 1974

5.05  Other residential establishments for children in 1974

5.06  The overall change in the placement of children in care by 1985

5.07  Local authority community homes in Gwynedd in 1985

5.08  Private residential homes and schools for children in Gwynedd in 1985

5.10  Residential homes and schools run by Paul Hett

5.14  Further change in the placement of children by 1996

5.15  Local authority community homes in Gwynedd in 1996

5.16  Bryn Melyn (Farm) Community

5.17  The scope of our account of alleged abuse in Gwynedd

Chapter 6: The Tribunal’s approach to the evidence

Part II: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN LOCAL AUTHORITY HOMES IN CLWYD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 7: Bryn Estyn, 1974 to 1984

7.01  Background

7.10  Organisation and structure as a community home with education on the premises

Chapter 8: The allegations of sexual abuse at Bryn Estyn

8.03  Peter Norman Howarth

8.11  The attitude of other members of the staff to Howarth’s activities

8.23  Stephen Roderick Norris

8.35  Allegations of sexual abuse against other members of the staff

8.45  Conclusions

Chapter 9: The case of Gordon Anglesea

9.01  Background

9.04  Witness A

9.05  Witness B

9.06  Witness C

9.08  Further witnesses for the Defendants

9.10  Anglesea’s evidence at the libel trial

9.12  Evidence heard by the Tribunal of Inquiry

9.14  Witness D

9.15  Witness E

9.17  Witness F

9.18  Anglesea’s visits to Bryn Estyn

9.23  Golfing activities

9.24  Freemasonry

9.25  Conclusions in respect of the allegations of sexual abuse made against Anglesea

9.32  Assessment of the evidence of witness B

9.35  Assessment of the evidence of witness C

9.37  Approach taken to the case of Gordon Anglesea by the North Wales Police

Chapter 10: The allegations of physical abuse at Bryn Estyn

10.04  Paul Bicker Wilson

10.40  David Gwyn Birch

10.58  The other members of the rugby set

10.82  The teaching staff

10.121  The night care staff

10.147  Other members of the care staff

10.159  Conclusions

Chapter 11: Other aspects of the Bryn Estyn regime

11.02  The cult of silence

11.07  The use of the secure unit

11.26  The quality of education

11.42  Recruitment and training of the staff

11.49  The quality of care generally

11.59  Some concluding observations

Chapter 12: Little Acton Assessment Centre, 1974 to 1980

12.02  The senior staff to 1978

12.06  The 1978 investigation

12.09  Valerie Halliwell

12.10  Leslie Wilson

12.11  Carl Evans

12.18  Peter Bird

12.21  The regime from 1978 to 1980

12.23  Complaints to the Tribunal

12.27  Peter Bird

12.29  Huw Meurig Jones

12.36  Carl Evans

12.40  Other members of staff

Other aspects of the regime at Little Acton Assessment Centre

12.42  The assessment process

12.46  Education at Little Acton Assessment Centre

12.49  The semi-secure unit

12.51  Conclusions

Chapter 13: Bersham Hall, 1974 to 1993

13.04  The Observation and Assessment Centre, 1974 to 1980

13.13  Complaints against members of the staff

13.14  Michael Taylor

13.21  Other allegations of abuse

13.24  The Children’s Centre, 1980 to 1993

13.30  Complaints against members of staff, 1980 to 1993

13.31  Contemporaneous complaints

Other complaints of abuse received by the Tribunal

13.42  Sexual abuse

Physical abuse

13.47  Christopher Thomas’ view

13.51  Michael Barnes

13.58  Allegations against Christopher Thomas

13.60  Other allegations of abuse and the use of the secure unit

13.66  Conclusions

Chapter 14: Chevet Hey, 1974 to 1990

14.06  The history to August 1979

14.11  The period from September 1979 to March 1986

14.12  Frederick Marshall Jones

14.20  Paul Bicker Wilson

14.28  Enoch Ellis Edwards

14.32  Jacqueline Elizabeth Thomas

14.46  Other allegations of abuse during this period

14.49  The period from April 1986 to June 1990

14.55  Further complaints of abuse

14.57  Frederick Marshall Jones

14.63  David Gwyn Birch

14.74  Another example of disciplinary action

14.75  The Nelson regime

14.80  Conclusions

Chapter 15: Cartrefle Community Home, 1974 to 1993

15.05  The Norris period, 1 December 1984 to 18 June 1990

15.06  Complaints against Stephen Norris

15.07  Allegations of sexual abuse by Norris

15.15  The response to Norris’ sexual abuse

15.19  Allegations of physical abuse by Norris

15.21  Other allegations of abuse during this period

15.39  The regime generally during Norris’ period

15.42  The Cartrefle Inquiry

15.51  The final period, 8 July 1990 to 12 March 1993

15.62  Other allegations of abuse during this period

15.63  General conclusions about Cartrefle

Chapter 16: Cherry Hill Community Home

16.01  Introduction

16.06  The nature of the problem

16.07  The process of investigation and the lack of remedial action

16.17  Conclusions

Chapter 17: Three community homes in north Clwyd

17.02  Upper Downing Community Home

17.16  Conclusions

17.17  South Meadow Community Home

17.20  1974 to 1981: the regime of Joan Glover

17.37  1981 to 1990: the regime of Glyn Williams

17.40  Conclusions

17.41  Park House Community Home

17.42  1974 to 1981: the regime of Mary Ellis

17.58  1981 to 1988: the interrupted regime of Jeffrey Douglas

17.79  The 1988 Inquiry

17.88  1989 to 1991: the David Evans regime

17.94  Conclusions

Part III: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN OTHER NON-PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN CLWYD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 18: Tanllwyfan

18.09  1974 to 1976

18.18  1976 to 1982

18.29  Conclusions

Chapter 19: Ysgol Talfryn

19.03  Allegations of sexual abuse

19.04  Allegations of physical abuse

19.20  Welsh Office inspections

19.27  Conclusions

Chapter 20: Gwynfa Residential Unit

20.01  Brief history

20.10  Previous investigations

20.17  Allegations of abuse

20.28  Conclusions

Part IV: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN CLWYD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 21: The Bryn Alyn Community

21.01  History and Organisation

21.18  The Community’s intake

Allegations of sexual abuse

21.23  John Ernest Allen

21.48  Anthony David Taylor

21.50  Iain Muir

21.52  Kenneth Taylor

21.54  Other allegations of sexual abuse

21.58  Allegations of physical abuse

21.59  John Ernest Allen

21.61  Peter Steen

21.78  Other complaints of physical abuse

21.99  Reports to the Welsh Office of alleged physical abuse

21.105  Deficiencies in the evidence about the use of physical force generally

21.107  Other aspects of the Community regime

21.116  Surveillance by the Welsh Office

21.126  Action by Clwyd Social Services Department

21.130  Conclusions

Chapter 22: Care Concern’s schools in Clwyd

22.01  Introduction

22.05  Ystrad Hall School

22.10  Allegations of sexual abuse

22.20  Allegations of physical abuse

22.28  Welsh Office inspections

22.32  Conclusions

22.33  Berwyn College for Girls

22.39  Allegations of abuse

22.47  Conclusions

22.48  The Village, Llangwyfan

Chapter 23: Clwyd Hall School

23.01  Introduction

23.08  Welsh Office inspections

23.15  Complaints of abuse

23.30  Conclusions

Part V: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER HOMES IN CLWYD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 24: The overall provision of foster care in Clwyd, 1974 to 1996

24.07  Complaints of abuse in foster homes in Clwyd

Chapter 25: The case of Roger Saint

25.01  Background and history prior to fostering

25.12  The Saints’ dealings with Clwyd Social Services Department and the latter’s failure to acquire knowledge of Roger Saint’s 1972 conviction

25.47  Placements with the Saints by Tower Hamlets

25.70  Later placements with the Saints

25.75  Conclusions

Chapter 26: Frederick Rutter

26.01  Background

26.05  The Rutters’ fostering history

26.16  Other allegations against Frederick Rutter

26.18  Conclusions

Chapter 27: Allegations against other foster parents resident in Clwyd

27.01  Introduction

27.02  Foster home A

27.20  Foster home B

27.29  Foster home C

27.36  Foster home D

27.43  Foster home E

27.53  Conclusions

Part VI: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIGHER MANAGEMENT IN CLWYD

Chapter 28: Management structures and responsibility for Clwyd Social Services from 1974 to 1996

28.01  Introduction

28.06  The Social Services Department under Emlyn Evans, 1974 to 1980

28.16  O & M Report, February 1980

28.22  The Gledwyn Jones regime, 1980 to 1991

28.32  The Final Phase and the delegation to divisions (1990 to 1996)

28.45  The role of the Chief Executive

28.55  Comment

Chapter 29: The failure to prevent sexual abuse or to detect it earlier

29.01  Introduction

29.06  The appointment of staff

29.25  The incidence of, and response to, complaints

29.49  The absence of any complaints procedure

29.51  The awareness of staff

29.60  The role of field social workers

29.65  Monitoring, inspection and rota visits

29.86  Conclusions

Chapter 30: The failure to eliminate physical abuse

30.01  Introduction

30.09  Recruitment of staff

30.15  Complaints procedures and the response to complaints

30.31  The inadequate recording of complaints and incidents

30.37  The lack of training opportunities for residential child care staff

30.41  Other relevant factors

30.43  Conclusions

Chapter 31: Basic failings in the quality of care

31.01  Introduction

31.04  The lack of adequate planning for each child in care

31.07  The absence of any strategic framework for placements

31.11  Ineffective reviewing processes and lack of consultation with the child

31.16  Intermittent and inadequate surveillance by field social workers

31.22  Failure to prepare residents for their discharge from care

31.31  Conclusions

Chapter 32: The response of higher management to investigations, including the Jillings inquiry

32.01  Introduction

32.04  The response to internal investigations before 1990

32.22  Later investigations

32.24  The Cartrefle Inquiry, 1990 to 1992

32.35  The Jillings inquiry and the Insurers’ involvement

Part VII: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN LOCAL AUTHORITY HOMES IN GWYNEDD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 33: Ty’r Felin, 1974 to 1995

33.01  Introduction

33.09  The pre-Dodd history (1974 to 1977)

33.22  The Dodds’ regime, 1978 to 1992

33.30  The disciplinary climate at Ty’r Felin under Nefyn Dodd

33.56  Allegations of sexual abuse

33.60  Allegations of physical abuse against Nefyn Dodd

33.86  Other allegations of physical abuse

33.115  The quality of care generally

33.126  The aftermath of the Dodds’ regime (1993 to 1995)

33.131  Conclusions

Chapter 34: Ty Newydd, 1982 to 1987

34.01  Introduction

34.08  Complaints by residents of abuse at Ty Newydd

34.13  Alison Taylor’s complaints and the criticisms of her

34.27  Conclusions

Chapter 35: Y Gwyngyll, 1979 to 1986

35.01  Introduction

35.17  Complaints of abuse during the Dyson period

35.18  Complaints of abuse during the Hughes’ regime

35.29  The quality of care generally

35.36  Conclusions

Chapter 36: 5 Queen’s Park Close, Holyhead

36.01  Introduction

36.13  Complaints of sexual abuse

36.42  Allegations of physical abuse

36.47  The quality of care generally

36.51  Conclusions

Chapter 37: Cartref Bontnewydd, 1988 to 1996

37.01  Introduction

37.05  Complaints of abuse

37.11  The quality of care generally

37.14  Conclusions

Part VIII: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN CARE IN PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN GWYNEDD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 38: Hengwrt Hall School and its successor, Aran Hall School

38.01  Introduction

38.14  Complaints of abuse

38.31  Surveillance by the Welsh Office

38.36  Conclusions

Chapter 39: The residential establishments of Paul Hett

39.01  Introduction

39.08  Ynys Fechan Hall

39.17  Do®l Rhyd School

39.30  Hengwrt House (Ysgol Hengwrt, later called The Pioneer Centre)

39.41  Complaints of sexual abuse

39.50  Complaints of physical abuse

39.59  Conclusions

39.61  Postscript on Ynys Fechan Hall

Part IX: ALLEGED ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER HOMES IN GWYNEDD BETWEEN 1974 AND 1996

Chapter 40: The overall provision of foster care in Gwynedd, 1974 to 1996

40.08  Complaints of abuse in foster homes in Gwynedd

Chapter 41: The case of M

41.01  Background

41.09  The allegations of abuse

41.22  Surveillance of M’s placement between 1980 and 1985

41.31  The response to the events of September 1985

41.46  Developments between 1986 and 1988

41.55  Conclusions

Chapter 42: Alleged sexual abuse of children in foster homes in Gwynedd

42.01  Introduction

42.03  Malcolm Ian Scrugham

42.19  Foster home B

42.25  Foster home C

42.37  Foster child D

42.46  Conclusions

Chapter 43: Other allegations of abuse in Gwynedd foster homes

43.01  Introduction

43.03  Foster home A

43.26  Foster home B

43.45  Foster home C

43.50  Conclusions

Part X: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIGHER MANAGEMENT IN GWYNEDD

Chapter 44: Management structures and responsibility for Gwynedd Social Services from 1974 to 1996

44.01  Introduction

44.03  The Social Services Department under T E Jones, 1974 to 1982

44.20  The interregnum under Ebsworth (1982/1983)

44.25  The regime of Lucille Hughes, 1983 to 1996

44.43  The role of the Chief Executive

44.63  Comments

Chapter 45: The failure to eliminate abuse

45.01  Introduction

45.06  The appointment and advancement of Nefyn Dodd

45.14  The absence of complaints procedures

45.17  The incidence of, and response to, complaints

45.24  Conclusions

Chapter 46: Basic failings in the quality of care

46.01  Introduction

46.03  The lack of adequate planning for each child in care

46.06  The absence of any strategic framework for placements

46.10  Ineffective reviewing processes and lack of consultation with the child

46.16  Intermittent and inadequate surveillance by field social workers

46.21  Failure to prepare residents for their discharge from care

46.29  The failure to heed adverse reports

46.36  The lack of financial resources

46.45  The input of councillors

46.49  Conclusions

Part XI: THE ROLE OF THE WELSH OFFICE

Chapter 47: The position of the Welsh Office in the structure and its child care objectives

47.01  The establishment of the Welsh Office

47.05  The administrative arrangements within the Welsh Office

47.20  The Welsh Office’s view of its role in respect of children’s services

47.26  The Children’s Regional Planning Committee for Wales

47.39  The provision of financial resources

47.47  The argument about the scope of the Welsh Office’s duties

47.53  Conclusions

Chapter 48: The effectiveness of Welsh Office inspections

48.01  Introduction

48.15  The record of SWSW/SSIW inspections

48.30  The record of HMI inspections

48.39  Conclusions

Chapter 49: Other relevant activities of the Welsh Office

49.01  Introduction

49.06  Recruitment and management of staff

49.19  Control and discipline

49.27  Training

49.40  Visiting

49.43  Complaints procedures

49.52  Fostering

49.57  The Welsh Office’s responses to Alison Taylor

49.71  Other relevant information communicated to the Welsh Office

49.88  The response to the Adrianne Jones report

49.92  Conclusions

Part XII: THE POLICE INVESTIGATIONS IN CLWYD AND GWYNEDD

Chapter 50: The general history of the police investigations and the nature of the criticisms

50.01  The North Wales Police

50.04  Investigations 1974 to 1980

50.08  Investigations 1981 to 1989

50.20  Investigations from 1990 to 1996

50.29  Investigations from 1997 to date

50.33  Criticisms of police responses outside the main investigations

50.41  The alleged impact of freemasonry

Chapter 51: The three main police investigations

51.01  Gwynedd 1986/1988

51.34  Cartrefle, 1990

51.40  The major North Wales investigation, 1991 onwards

51.60  The demands for an investigation by an outside force

51.79  Conclusions

Chapter 52: Was there a paedophile ring?

52.01  Introduction

52.09  Paedophile activity at and connected with Bryn Estyn and Cartrefle

52.22  Recruitment generally

52.28  Paedophile activity in and around Wrexham town

52.59  The investigation of Gary Cooke in 1979

52.71  The Campaign for Homosexual Equality

52.80  Paedophile activity on the North Wales coast

52.84  Conclusions

Part XIII: THE SUCCESSOR AUTHORITIES

Chapter 53:The new structures and resources

53.01  Introduction

53.05  Anglesey

53.15  Conwy

53.25  Gwynedd

53.33  Denbighshire

53.44  Flintshire

53.56  Wrexham

Chapter 54: Some continuing concerns

54.01  Introduction

54.03  The responses of the successor authorities to Adrianne Jones

54.19  The overall provision of residential care

54.23  The monitoring of foster placements

54.27  The supervision of children leaving care

54.28  Financial provision generally

54.30  Conclusions

Part XIV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 55: Conclusions

55.01  Introduction

55.10  Summary of our conclusions

55.11  Postscript

Chapter 56: Recommendations

56.01  Introduction

56.05  The Tribunal’s recommendations

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Acknowledgements

Appendix 2: The Tribunal and its staff

Appendix 3: Representation

Appendix 4: Note by the Chairman of the Tribunal on its procedures

Appendix 5: Report of the Witness Support Team

Appendix 6: Main statutory regulation from 1974 until the Children Act 1989 came into force on 14 October 1991

Appendix 7: Statutes and Statutory Instruments cited in the report

Appendix 8: List of main relevant publications

Appendix 9: Welsh Office and other departmental Circulars cited in the report

Appendix 10: Anatomy of a weekend

Appendix 11: Statement of Sir Ronald Hadfield, assessor to the Tribunal in respect of police matters

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Please note:

Complainants and some others are identified in this report by a capital letter instead of by name. The identification by letter is consistent within individual chapters but has no application outside that chapter unless expressly stated.

http://tna.europarchive.org/20040216040105/http:/www.doh.gov.uk/lostincare/20102a.htm